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PRIOR RESTRAINTS REVISITED: HAVE THE COURTS
FINALLY SHACKLED THE PRESS?
The Noriega case was a bad case from the day they had an
invasion to seize him and then seized his assets. Now he's justi-
fied the illegal taping of conversations between a lawyer and
client, and a prior restraint. Noriega is going to do more dam-
age to the U.S. Constitution than he ever did as a dictator of
Panama.
-Professor Burt Neuborne,
New York University School of Law'
I. INTRODUCTION
General Manuel Noriega is currently detained at the Metropolitan
Correctional Center ("MCC") located in Dade County, Florida.2 Ap-
prehended and brought to this country in the controversial American
invasion of Panama in 1989, the former dictator awaits sentencing fol-
lowing his convictions of drug trafficking, racketeering, and money laun-
dering by a Florida jury.' During his incarceration, Noriega made
telephone calls from MCC to his attorneys and other members of his
defense team. The conversations were allegedly recorded by MCC offi-
cials and obtained by Cable News Network ("CNN") from an undis-
closed source.4
The fact that tapes of these conversations had been made was signifi-
cant because it raised the possibility that prison officials had compro-
mised General Noriega's right to confidentiality in preparing his
defense.' CNN notified Noriega's attorney about the existence of the
tapes, and informed him of their intent to air a portion of one of the tapes
in an upcoming news report. Noriega's attorney immediately sought an
1. Edward Wasserman, Noriega Puts Justice System on Trial Maybe the Government is
Trying to Blow Its Case. LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 3, 1990 (Opinion and Commentary), at 24.
2. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1045, 1046 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
3. Larry Rohter, U.S Jury Convicts Noriega of Drug-Trafficking Role as the Leader of
Panama, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1992, at Al.
4. David Johnston, Citing Taped Talk Lawyer for Noriega Wants Case Voided, N.Y.
TIMES, (Late Edition), Nov. 9, 1990, at Al.
5. Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; Despite CNN'sFolly, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1990, at
A39.
536 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12
injunction against CNN's newscast,6 fearing that the broadcast of the
tapes would disclose confidential information protected by the attorney-
client privilege.' The court granted Noriega's injunction in United States
v. Noriega ("Noriega").8 From that moment on, "CNN's hot news story
became overshadowed by the story of the network's own... actions."9
Noriega marks the first time in twenty-five years that a federal appel-
late court has upheld a prior restraint order on the press.10 The United
States Supreme Court has declined to review the decision.II The ruling
has plunged First Amendment law into uncertainty and has called into
question the fundamental principles of freedom of speech and freedom of
the press. Although the prior restraint was eventually lifted, the legal
implications reach further than the ultimate judicial conclusions. In es-
sence, the initial decision suggests, ominously for the press, that the
courts' responsibility of ensuring that the accused has a fair trial out-
weighs the right of the press to publish. 
12
This note analyzes the issues facing the court in balancing CNN's
First Amendment right to free speech 3 against Noriega's Sixth Amend-
ment right to a fair trial: 4 the familiar free press versus fair trial di-
lemma.' Part II of this note details the chronology of the daily court
6. Motion of General Manuel Antonio Noriega for Injunction, United States v. Noriega,
752 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (No. 88-79-CR).
7. The attorney-client privilege provides that confidential communications between an
attorney and a client in the course of the professional relationship cannot be disclosed without
the consent of the client. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 34 (2d ed. 1984).
8. 752 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
9. How Prior Restraint Came to America, AM. LAW., Jan./Feb. 1991, at 89, 90.
10. Prior restraint is any prohibition on the publication or communication of information
prior to such publication or communication. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 363 (2d ed. 1984).
In the case at hand, the prior restraint issue is whether the district court judge could prevent
CNN from airing the tapes.
11. Cable News Network, Inc. v. Noriega, 111 S. Ct. 451 (1990) (O'Connor, Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting).
12. Stuart Taylor, Jr., CNN's First Amendment Hubris, LEGAL TiMEs, Nov. 19, 1990, at
23.
13. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
14. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury ... and have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
15. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment to afford spe-
cial protection against orders that prohibit the publication or broadcast of particular informa-
tion. Preventing the issuance of orders that impose a previous or prior restraint is the primary
purpose of the First Amendment guarantee of free press. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 556 (1976). See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454,462 (1907) ("The main purpose
of the First Amendment is to prevent all such previous restraints upon publication.").
On the other hand, the Sixth Amendment guarantees the criminally accused the right to
trial by an impartial jury. The Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that each juror
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proceedings and Part III discusses the rationales underlying the district
and appellate courts' decisions. Part IV criticizes the courts' reasoning,
concluding that: (1) the district court incorrectly applied precedential
case law regarding the proper issuance of prior restraints; and (2) the
appellate court further confused the issue by ignoring prior restraint case
law, fashioning an entirely improper test in order to uphold the restraint.
Part V of this note concludes that a prior restraint was improper in the
case at hand because the requirements mandated by precedential law
were not first fulfilled. While the result may have been justifiable, the
courts' failure to properly analyze the issue at stake in such a vital case
rendered the prior restraint unwarranted.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The following chronology intertwines the facts of the CNN news
story with the numerous court proceedings surrounding the broadcast of
the tapes.
LATE OCTOBER (1990): Marlene Fernandez, a correspondent
who works for Spanish CNN ("Noticiero Telemundo CNN"), received
several tape recordings containing conversations between General Ma-
nuel Antonio Noriega and his family, friends, and legal team. 6 Notify-
ing CNN's main office, Fernandez and reporter John Camp began
compiling two reports. The first report suggested that Noriega was at-
tempting to rebuild his power base from prison, and the second focused
on the making of the tapes which "rais[ed] the possibility that prison
officials had compromised General Noriega's right to confidentiality in
preparing his defense." 7 The fact that the government had recorded the
must base his or her verdict solely on evidence presented at trial, without any outside influence
through media, news or television. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961).
Although news reports are unlikely to compromise the defendant's right to trial in most
cases, some jurors may be affected by publicity in sensationalized criminal cases, resulting in
conflict between these two essential rights. This free press/fair trial conflict must be resolved
without compromising either right, because the Constitution does not give either right priority
over the other. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 561.
Judges have used a wide range of options to solve this dilemma, primarily: (1) denying
the media the right of access to the information; and (2) issuing a gag order, or restraint on the
media. This note concerns the latter option, whereby the media are restricted from disseminat-
ing information they possess. Mark R. Stabile, Note, Free Press-Fair Triab Can They Be
Reconciled in a Highly Publicized Criminal Case?, 79 GEO. L.J. 337, 338-41 (1990).
16. The circumstances under which the tapes were made still remain murky. So far, the
Drug Enforcement Agency, the State Department, and the Panamanian government have been
implicated in the potential taping. Wasserman, supra note 1.
17. Lewis, supra note 5.
Phone calls from federal prisons are routinely and legally tape recorded by prison officials
in order to keep an inmate from criminally plotting behind bars. Inmates, including Noriega,
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conversations was quickly obscured, however, by the wrangle over
CNN's right to broadcast them.
NOVEMBER 6: CNN first contacted the Criminal Division of the
Justice Department, which refused to comment on the tapes."8 Then,
CNN met Frank Rubino, Noriega's attorney, and played him a tape of
what seemed to be a conversation between Noriega and his defense
team. 9 After listening to the tape off-camera, Rubino agreed to give an
on-camera interview to CNN.20 During this interview, Rubino replayed
a short portion of the tape, identified the voices of Noriega and a member
of his defense team, and described generally the substance of the conver-
sation on the tape.2 Rubino expressed shock that the government had
taped these private conversations, and called the tapes "a horrendous
violation of [Noriega's] constitutional rights."22
NOVEMBER 7: Rubino called reporter Camp and requested writ-
ten assurances that CNN would not broadcast the tapes, fearing that me-
dia disclosure would irreparably impair Noriega's right to a fair trial.2 3
CNN refused. CNN told Rubino that the first of several tapes was set to
be aired the next day.2 4 That evening, Rubino filed an emergency motion
in federal district court in Miami to prohibit the broadcast of the tapes.2 5
NOVEMBER 8: At 7:00 a.m., CNN aired the first segment of its
report, which focused on the existence of the tapes themselves and possi-
ble governmental misconduct in the taping, but which did not contain
any of the allegedly privileged material.2 6 At the 8:30 a.m. hearing, dis-
are informed of this policy. Each time an inmate uses the telephone, he is required to notify
his guards of the nature of his calls. Calls from an inmate to his legal team are monitored
unless the inmate states that the call is legal business and asks that it not be monitored.
Noriega had signed an acknowledgment of this. Johnston, supra note 4.
"The mystery is whether the government taped calls to his lawyers' office with Noriega's
consent, or by inadvertence, or by design." Taylor, supra note 12. If the recording was pur-
poseful, evidencing government misconduct, taping the conversations may have been enough
to result in dismissal of the indictment. On the other hand, Noriega may have legally waived
his expectation of privacy if he had not followed proper procedure and informed the guard
whom he was calling.
18. Noriega Tapes (CNN television broadcast, Nov. 8, 1990).
19. How Prior Restraint Came to America, supra note 9, at 90.
20. Id
21. Id
22. Johnston, supra note 4.
23. Camp also stated that Rubino said he was worried that he might have waived his
privilege the day before when he disclosed the contents of the tapes for the press. How Prior
Restraint Came to America, supra note 9, at 90.
24. Id
25. Motion of General Manuel Antonio Noriega for Injunction, United States v. Noriega,
752 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (No. 88-79-CR).
26. Johnston, supra note 4. This first segment referenced two calls that Noriega had made
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trict court Judge William Hoeveler was presented with the task of bal-
ancing Noriega's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial against CNN's
First Amendment right to be free from prior restraint against broad-
cast.27 Noriega's attorney argued that prior restraint was merited be-
cause of the privileged nature of the conversations on the tapes but
indicated that his main concern was with possible governmental miscon-
duct.28 The government claimed that although the prosecution team
knew of the tapes' existence, the prosecutors remained untainted because
they had not heard any information contained on the tapes.29 The gov-
ernment also announced that it would begin an immediate investigation
of the tapes' release.30 CNN contested Noriega's prior restraint motion
on three grounds: (1) Noriega had failed to meet the heavy burden of
proof required for issuance of a prior restraint; (2) other alternatives
could protect Noriega's interests; and (3) the prior restraint would be
ineffective in protecting Noriega's interests."
Judge Hoeveler rejected CNN's arguments and stated that he had to
listen to the tapes in order to determine the potential threat to Noriega's
right to a fair trial.32 CNN declined the court's request to turn over the
tapes, contending that the court should instead obtain the tapes from the
government, who was responsible for the improper taping.33 Before
recessing, the district court orally ordered CNN not to telecast the attor-
ney-client-privileged tapes pending its ruling.34 CNN filed an emergency
motion with the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals to vacate the district
court's order.35
from prison: one to the Cuban Embassy, the other to an ex-Panamanian official named
"Luchio." The substance of the conversation with Luchio arguably could have been inter-
preted as an instance of Noriega making covert reference to re-establishing his power base in
Panama while still in prison. Id
27. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1032, 1033 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
28. Transcript of Hearing Before the Honorable William M. Hoeveler, United States Dis-
trict Judge, Nov. 8 and 9, 1990, at 4, United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D. Fla.
1990) (No. 88-79-CR) [hereinafter Transcript].
29. Id at 16.
30. Id at 81.
31. How Prior Restraint Came to America, supra note 9, at 91.
32. Transcript, supra note 28, at 66.
33. CNN stated that because the government had done the taping, the government's tapes
should be reviewed to see if they contained any attorney-client conversations that would be
damaging to Noriega if disclosed. Judge Hoeveler reluctantly agreed to have the government
compile a log of its tape recordings, but added: "[If] there are 20 or 10 or so, we can have
them [the actual tapes] reproduced ... if there are 150 that presents us with a different prob-
lem." Id at 95.
34. d
35. Emergency Motion of Appellant CNN, United States v. Noriega (In re CNN and
Turner Broadcasting System), 917 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1990) (Nos. 90-5927, 90-5932).
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Later that day, the district court issued a written order continuing
the earlier oral prior restraint that barred telecast of the tapes until the
court could review them, and directed CNN to produce the tapes to the
court.36 CNN opposed the production order on First Amendment
grounds.37 Before submitting the written order, Judge Hoeveler heard
oral arguments and agreed to stay the portion of the order directing
CNN to produce the tapes, pending appellate review of the prior re-
straint issue."s Additionally, the district court ordered the government
to identify the number of attorney-client-privileged tapes in its possession
in order to facilitate review by the court.39
NOVEMBER 9: After CNN's first telecast, government prosecu-
tors denied that any improper taping of Noriega's attorney-client com-
munications had occurred.' ° CNN wanted to run the portion of the tape
it had played for Rubino to show that the government could indeed have
recorded the information. In deciding to air a second segment, CNN
explained, "Our credibility was on the line. We felt it became necessary
to go beyond just what we had shown."41
Meanwhile, the government provided district court Judge Hoeveler
with a list of all of Noriega's conversations that the prison had recorded.
He found the list too voluminous and of no help in evaluating the phone
conversations CNN had planned to air.' The court determined that
CNN's production of the tapes would be "the more efficient alterna-
tive"'43 because "pursuing the alternative of reviewing the government's
tapes would be 'physically impossible' in less than a month."" After
hearing arguments, however, the district court again stayed the order
compelling production of the tapes.45
The district court issued a supplemental written order holding that
36. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
37. How Prior Restraint Came to America, supra note 9, at 91-92.
38. Transcript, supra note 28, at 92, 100. Thus, the court of appeals' ruling was incorrect
in stating that CNN willfully refused to produce the tapes in light of the district court's order.
See infra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
39. Transcript, supra note 28, at 95.
40. Johnston, supra note 4.
41. How Prior Restraint Came to America, supra note 9, at 91.
42. Transcript, supra note 28, at 105. Moreover, the court noted that a review of the tapes
in the government's possession did not necessarily determine whether disclosure of the tapes in
CNN's possession would harm Noriega's right to a fair trial. The court believed that CNN
may have possessed other conversations not shown on the government's log. United States v.
Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 n.1 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
43. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1032, 1036 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
44. Transcript, supra note 28, at 107. This effectively shifted the burden of proof to CNN.
See infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
45. Transcript, supra note 28, at 119-120.
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its prior restraint, now called a temporary restraining order ("TRO"),
would remain in effect for up to ten days, or such lesser time as required
by the district court to review CNN's tapes." Later that evening, how-
ever, CNN went forward with the telecast of the second segment,47 mo-
ments after Judge Hoeveler had warned CNN's lawyer he would fine
CNN if it violated his order barring the broadcast.48 As Judge Hoeveler
was leaving the courthouse, he remarked to a reporter that CNN was in
contempt.
49
NOVEMBER 10: The district court reconvened amidst a flurry of
activity. Noriega moved for a finding of contempt against CNN on the
ground of the previous night's telecast.5 0 Concurrently, CNN moved to
have Judge Hoeveler recused from the case based on his "contempt"
comment the previous night. Subsequently, the district court stayed all
proceedings pending the appellate court's review.51
The day's major event was the ruling of the Eleventh Circuit Court
46. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1032, 1034 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
47. At the heart of the controversy was this second broadcast containing the allegedly
privileged communication between Noriega, Rubino's secretary, and Rubino's paralegal. In
this conversation, Noriega referred to two witnesses, Alfredo Sanchez and Felipe Camarago,
whom he believed could testify against him. David Johnston, Order Against CNNBroadcast Is
Upheld, N.Y. IMEs, Nov. 11, 1990, § 1, at 20.
Not only did CNN risk sanctions themselves for airing the segment, but as one reporter
put it, "CNN's decision to violate the court order has put all of the press in jeopardy. It runs
the risk of inflaming judges against an arrogant press." Lewis, supra note 5.
48. How Prior Restraint Came to America, supra note 9, at 91.
49. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 444, 446 n. I (S.D. Fla. 1990). This formed the
basis for CNN's recusal petition.
50. Transcript of Hearing Before the Honorable William M. Hoeveler, United States Dis-
trict Judge, Nov. 10, 1990, at 13, United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
(No. 88-79-CR). CNN disputed the contempt proceedings, based on its belief that it did not
telecast attorney-client-privileged communications in violation of the court's order. CNN reit-
erated that it felt Rubino had waived any attorney-client privilege by listening to the tapes.
How Prior Restraint Came to America supra note 9, at 92.
Alternatively, CNN had reason to believe that in the face of a threatened contempt mo-
tion, a patently unconstitutional restraining order could be violated. The First Circuit vacated
a finding of criminal contempt against the Providence Journal for publication of illegally ob-
tained wiretaps about a deceased mobster. In the Matter of Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d
1342 (1st Cir. 1986), modifed, 820 F.2d 1354 (1st Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert dismissed, 485
U.S. 693 (1988). The court of appeals found that the Fourth Amendment was not a sufficient
basis and "could not conceivably support the restraint against publication." Id at 1349. This
case has come to stand for the principle that a patently unconstitutional prior restraint may be
violated if it is transparently invalid. Thus, CNN had reason to believe that the prior restraint
would be overturned, taking the contempt proceedings along with it.
51. In spite of strong threats, Judge Hoeveler did no more than toy with fining CNN.
Transcript of Hearing Before the Honorable William M. Hoeveler, United States District
Judge, Nov. 12, 1990, at 29-32, United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 444 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
(No. 88-79-CR). The Chief Judge of the District Court denied CNN's recusal motion. United
States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. at 449.
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of Appeals, which upheld the TRO and ordered CNN to produce the
tapes for review.5 2 In the court's words, "CNN has shackled the district
court by refusing that court's reasonable request to.. . [turn over] the
audio tapes it has in its possession .... No litigant should continue to
violate a district court's order and attempt to have that district court's
order reviewed at the same time."1
5 3
NOVEMBER 11-12: On Sunday night, the attorneys at CNN held
a midnight caucus to begin preparing their briefs for certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court. 4 The next morning, CNN returned to the
district court with an offer of compromise: CNN would turn over a log
of the tapes in its possession to the court, so that its log could be com-
pared to the government's log to pinpoint the dates and times of the al-
legedly damaging conversations.5 5 Judge Hoeveler declined CNN's
request, stating he would wait to review the tapes "until after the
Supreme Court had taken a position."5 6 Dejected, CNN could only wait.
NOVEMBER 15-18: CNN filed two briefs with the Supreme Court:
one to stay the restraining order that the district court had issued, the
other to grant certiorari to consider the prior restraint as unconstitu-
tional. In a final blow to CNN, the Supreme Court in a 7-2 decision
denied the stay and refused to grant certiorari.57
NOVEMBER 20 AND THEREAFTER: Following the Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari, the district court proceeded to review the
tapes. Ironically, the aftermath involving the tapes themselves was anti-
climactic after the whirlwind surrounding the prior restraint. CNN
turned over the tapes, which were transcribed and translated by the dis-
trict court. A federal magistrate reviewed the manuscript and lifted the
restraint, finding that nothing was so damaging in the content of the
tapes as to impair Noriega's right to a fair trial.5 " Soon afterward, over
52. United States v. Noriega, 917 F.2d 1543, 1552 (11th Cir. 1990).
53. Id at 1551-52. The district court had orally stayed the order requiring CNN to pro-
duce the tapes. The matter of the order, however, was not before the appellate court. See infra
notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
54. How Prior Restraint Came to America, supra note 9, at 93. Interestingly, CNN con-
vinced Floyd Abrams, the attorney who successfully argued the Pentagon Papers case, to ar-
gue the briefs if the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id.
55. Transcript of Hearing Before the Honorable William M. Hoeveler, United States Dis-
trict Judge, Nov. 12, 1990, at 4-5, United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 444 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
(No. 88-79-CR).
56. Id. at 29.
57. Cable News Network, Inc. v. Noriega, 111 S. Ct. 451 (1990) (O'Connor, Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting).
58. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1045, 1053-54 (S.D. Fla. 1990). In fact, the
tapes were so jumbled and incomprehensible, the court found them neither newsworthy nor
prejudicial. Id. at 1053. For this reason, CNN chose not to air the tapes after the prior re-
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protests from CNN, other media organizations were allowed to obtain
copies of the tapes from the court.59
Six months later, Rubino sought a dismissal of the indictment
against Noriega based on the government's improper taping of the phone
calls.' After a fact-finding hearing on the merits of the tapes themselves,
the district court denied the dismissal."1
III. SUMMARY OF THE COURTS' REASONING
A. The District Court's Reasoning
The district court's quandary began "[w]ith the unfortunate and dif-
ficult task of resolving a conflict between two fundamental constitutional
rights: the First Amendment right of the press to be free from any prior
restraint on speech, and the Sixth Amendment right of an accused to a
fair trial."6 In this case of first impression, the court noted that the
damaging information could not only hamper the selection of an impar-
tial jury, but it could also reveal the defendant's trial strategy to the pros-
ecution. 3 Although the court acknowledged the privilege issue and the
possibility that disclosure would reveal the protected confidences, the
court opted to frame the "issue at stake... more properly... as the
defendant's right to a fair trial.""
In doing so, the district court was better able to justify its imposition
straint issue was decided. This confirmed that the issue at hand was the restraint, not the tapes
themselves.
59. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1037 (S.D. Fla. 1990). The Miami Herald
Publishing Company; Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., d/b/a WPLG Channel 10; Gan-
nett Satellite Information Network, Inc. (USA Today); Gannett Co., Inc.; and the Associated
Press brought a collective action requesting the transcripts of the Noriega tapes. 1Id CNN
asserted a proprietary interest in the transcripts, and "urge[d] the court to either destroy the
transcripts or surrender them to CNN for its exclusive use." Id at 1038. The court rejected
CNN's argument, and turned over the tapes. Id at 1045.
60. United States v. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. 1480, 1482 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
61. Id Noriega moved to dismiss the indictment, asserting violations of the Sixth Amend-
ment, the Fourth Amendment, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,
and Rules 16 and 17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id at 1482. The court
found that Noriega's constitutional rights were not violated with respect to the claims asserted
under the Fourth and Sixth Amendments. 1Id The court found that the Title III claim, based
upon improper disclosure of intercepted communications, was improper in the context of a
motion to dismiss. The court did find that the prosecution's method of obtaining the record-
ings and its failure to disclose these conversations in the course of discovery violated Rules 16
and 17, but, since no resulting prejudice occurred, it denied the motion. I'd
62. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1032, 1033 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
63. Id at 1033.
64. Id The court commented that the main purpose of the attorney-client privilege was to
protect uninhibited communication between attorney and client and that this was violated the
very moment that the tapes were received by the government. Id. Immediately thereafter,
1992]
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of a prior restraint on CNN. As the district court noted, "[a] prior re-
straint is presumptively unconstitutional, with the movant bearing the
'heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a re-
straint.'6 . .. This does not mean, however, that no situation exists in
which a prior restraint on the press is justified."66 One such situation
may arise in ensuring a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial in the
face of excessive pre-trial publicity. In these cases, courts have adopted
the test formulated in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart ("Nebraska
Press"),67 which states that before a restraint may be issued, the court
must find that: (1) the nature and extent of pre-trial publicity impairs the
defendant's right to a fair trial; (2) no less restrictive alternative measures
exist which would mitigate the effects of the publicity; and (3) a prior
restraint would effectively prevent the harm.68
Noriega's attorney reported that portions of the tapes contained
"discussion[s] of witnesses, defense investigation[s], and trial strategy at
the core of Noriega's defense,"'69 which would jeopardize Noriega's right
to a fair trial if disclosed. Since the content of CNN's tapes was not
before the district court, the court concluded that it was "impossible to
assess, at this stage, the precise extent to which Noriega's right to a fair
trial would be hampered by disclosure."70 While stating that further in-
quiry was required, the court nonetheless sustained the prior restraint
until the court could review the tapes in CNN's possession.71
The district court's supplemental order, which was issued to clarify
its decision, reiterated the necessity of examining the tapes' contents to
determine the "nature and extent of potential damage [to Noriega] before
dissemination."7" Because CNN had resisted turning over the tapes to
the court, Judge Hoeveler explained that "the court was in effect being
asked to make a factual determination without being allowed to review
the facts."'7 3 In the court's view, it was unfair to allow CNN to "benefit
from its refusal to disclose the content of the tapes."7 Therefore, Judge
Hoeveler continued the restraining order for ten days, or any lesser time
Rubino and Noriega would be wary of conducting forthright conversations over the MCC
phones, thus producing the exact disincentive the privilege was designed to overcome.
65. Id (quoting Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).
66. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1032, 1033 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
67. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
68. Id at 562-68.
69. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1032, 1034 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
70. Id
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1036.
73. Id at 1035.
74. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
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for review of the tapes.75
B. The Court of Appeals' Reasoning
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals first addressed the issue of
whether the district court was justified in entering the TRO in order to
maintain the status quo of the case pending a decision on the merits.7 6
The appellate court noted that the balancing of First and Sixth Amend-
ment rights in a "sensational" case was not an easy task, but concluded,
based on Fifth Circuit precedent, that the lower court's main responsibil-
ity was to ensure the accused's right to a fair trial." The appellate court
articulated that in order to effectuate a fair trial, the lower courts are
afforded broad discretion, which may include "restrictions on parties, ju-
rors, lawyers, and others involved with the proceedings despite the fact
that such restrictions might affect First Amendment considerations."7 "
After thus delineating the lower court's duty, the Eleventh Circuit
analyzed the press' right of access to pre-trial proceedings.79 First, the
court determined that the information on the tapes should be weighted
according to whether the matter has historically been open to the press
and the public."0 Applying this analysis, the court noted that communi-
cations between a criminal defendant and his defense counsel historically
have been private; even if not privileged, they have not been open to the
public."' Next, relying on Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.
("Nixon"), 2 the court asserted that the press "has no right to informa-
tion about a trial superior to that of the public," 3 and thus, the press had
75. Id at 1036.
76. United States v. Noriega, 917 F.2d 1543, 1546-48 (11th Cir. 1990). Several matters
were before the court of appeals: an appeal from the oral order from the morning of Novem-
ber 8 (the initial issuance of the temporary restraining order ("TRO")); two written orders
(one contained the TRO from the afternoon of November 8th, the other contained the supple-
mental order that continued the TRO for 10 days); and a last-minute petition, attached by
CNN for recusal of Judge Hoeveler, based on his "contempt" comment. The oral order was
immediately dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Id at 1546. The recusal petition was conclu-
sively denied, with no discussion of the merits. Id Thus, the only issue remaining was the
TRO.
77. United States v. Noriega, 917 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1990).
78. Id at 1548 (citing U.S. v. C.B.S., Inc., 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974); U.S. v. Schiavo,
504 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1974)).
79. The appellate court's confusion of right to access with right to dissemination was a
fundamentally incorrect analysis. See infra notes 176-89 and accompanying text.
80. United States v. Noriega, 917 F.2d 1543, 1547-50 (11th Cir. 1990).
81. Id. at 1547 n.6.
82. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
83. Id at 609.
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no right to broadcast information that would harm a defendant's right to
a fair trial.
The appellate court then relied on the test in Press Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court ("Press Enterprise II") s' in order to determine if the pre-
trial publicity would hamper the defendant's right to a fair trial. In Press
Enterprise IL the Supreme Court upheld a trial court's decision to close a
preliminary hearing to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial. Anal-
ogizing the Noriega case to a closure case, 5 the Eleventh Circuit directed
the district court to apply the Press Enterprise II test, which permits clo-
sure if: (1) a substantial probability exists that the defendant's right to a
fair trial will be prejudiced by the publicity; (2) a substantial probability
exists that closure would prevent that prejudice; and (3) reasonable alter-
natives to closure cannot adequately protect the defendant's fair trial
rights.
8 6
Last, the appellate court addressed the issue of the attorney-client
privilege and how it related to the district court's analysis of potential
harm to Noriega. 7 The appellate court suggested that whether the com-
munications between Noriega and his defense counsel were privileged,
"while not necessarily dispositive of whether such communications
should be publicly broadcast," would be relevant to the district court's
assessment of potential harm to Noriega's right to a fair trial.88 Ulti-
mately, the appellate court found that the lower court needed to hear the
tapes in order to make its determination, and thus ordered the immediate
production of the tapes held by CNN, while concurrently upholding the
restraint.8 9
IV. ANALYSIS
It goes without saying that criminal trials involving high-profile
figures generate a great deal of press coverage and publicity. Protected
under the First Amendment, the media engage in news gathering in or-
der to report to the public. First Amendment free press rights guarantee
the media the ability to do its job, without fear of repercussions in its
84. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
85. In a closure case, the court typically denies the media access to court proceedings. See
id
86. Press Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 14. The appellate court again improperly focused on a
closure case that denied the media access to court proceedings, rather than relying on prior
restraint cases. The district court realized the appellate court's folly, and completely ignored
the Press Enterprise I case when it eventually lifted the restraint.
87. United States v. Noriega, 917 F.2d at 1550-51.
88. Id. at 1551.
89. Id. at 1551-52.
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news reporting.' In fact, "[t]he press does not just publish information
about trials, but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting
the police, prosecutors, and judicial process to extensive public scrutiny
and criticism."9 The public depends on the media for timely and accu-
rate disclosure of any actual or apparent misconduct by a governmental
agency.
92
Thus, CNN's desire to telecast information concerning alleged gov-
ernmental misfeasance in a major criminal case involving General
Noriega suggests that more protection should have been afforded to
CNN to publish what it had learned.93 As stated in Elrod v. Burns,94
"[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of
time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." 95 As legal scholar
A. Bickel commented, "If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil
sanctions after publication 'chills' speech, prior restraint 'freezes' it
... ."96 Further, "[p]rior restraints fall on speech with a brutality and
finality of their own. Even if they are ultimately lifted, they cause irre-
mediable loss-a loss in the immediacy, the impact, of speech .... A
prior restraint stops more speech more effectively." 9
A. District Court Failed to Meet the Nebraska Press Test
1. Prior Restraint Presumptively Unconstitutional
Noriega involves an unprecedented prior restraint on publication.
90. Lewis, supra note 5.
91. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
92. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 606 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
As Justice Brennan noted, a temporary restraining order postpones publication, and an appeal
can cause further delay that may "destroy the contemporary news value of the information the
press seeks to disseminate." Id, at 609.
93. As the Supreme Court stated in Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975),
"Great responsibility is accordingly placed upon the news media to report fully and accurately
the proceedings of government .... [T]he function of the press serves to guarantee the fairness
of trials and to bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of
justice." Id at 491-92.
94. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
95. Id at 373.
96. Nebraska Pre= 427 U.S. at 559 (quoting A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 61
(1975)). "When a prior restraint is imposed by means of a court order, the speaker is immedi-
ately sanctioned [by being silenced]. In contrast, the criminal sanction of a speaker who has
violated an unconstitutional statute is deferred until all avenues of appellate review have been
exhausted, and the civil sanction is deferred until the judgment becomes final." Diane Pappas,
Note, First Amendment Protection of Criminal Defense Attorneys' Extrajudicial Statements in
the Decade Since Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 8 WHrrTIER L. REv. 1021, 1023
(1987).
97. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 559 (quoting A. BICKEL, THE MORALrrY OF CONSENT 61
(1975)).
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Prior restraints have been described as "one of the most extraordinary
remedies known to our jurisprudence."98 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court views prior restraint on the press with a heavy presumption
against their constitutionality.99 In the face of Sixth Amendment con-
cerns such as those advanced here, the Supreme Court has held that
prior restraint on news media is clearly invalid."o°
In Near v. Minnesota ("Near"), 10' the United States Supreme Court
rejected a prior restraint against an anti-Semitic publication that dis-
turbed the "public peace" and provoked "assaults and the commission of
crime," emphasizing that such orders should be granted only in "excep-
tional cases."" 2 Chief Justice Hughes suggested that prior restraints
might be granted only in narrowly defined circumstances, for example, if
the published information would threaten national security.1
0 3
More recently, in New York Times Co. v. United States ("New York
Times"),'% the Supreme Court rejected requests for prior restraint
against the publication of the Pentagon Papers, which were alleged to
have been stolen from the government and to contain highly sensitive
national security information. 10 5 A concurring opinion, particularly ap-
posite to the nature of CNN's news coverage here, pointed out that
"[t]he dominant purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit the
widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing infor-
mation."" The Supreme Court stated that any system of prior re-
straints of expression is presumed invalid 0 7 and imposes a heavy burden
of justification upon the government for the imposition of such a
98. Nebraska Pre.= 427 U.S. at 562.
99. Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968) (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51, 57 (1965); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
100. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976).
101. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
102. Id. at 716.
103. I1. For example, a restraint may be issued on the publication of sailing dates of trans-
ports or the number and location of troops in time of war. Id. (citation omitted).
104. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). The Supreme Court reaffirmed its hostility toward
prior restraint and in dicta recognized only a narrow military exception as Near had done. The
potential injury to an accused's Sixth Amendment rights "could never be considered so direct,
immediate, and irreparable" as the damage to our military or national security, the sole excep-
tion that may justify a prior restraint. Nebraska Pres. 427 U.S. at 604 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring). See, eg., United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979). In the
Progressive case, the district court enjoined publication of a magazine article on the basis of
national security; the article revealed technical material on how to manufacture a hydrogen
bomb. I
105. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714-18 (Black, J. & Douglas, J., concurring).
106. Id at 723-24.
107. I. at 714 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
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restraint. 108
In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,"o9 the news media were restrained
from publishing information about a grisly sex murder trial in a small,
rural community based on the claim that a defendant's right to a fair trial
could not survive the media's publicity."I The suppressed information
in Nebraska Press involved far more potential prejudice than in the in-
stant case: the media there had obtained the defendant's taped confes-
sion to the crime itself, together with admissions that the defendant had
made to third parties. " Yet, noting that the primary purpose of the
First Amendment was to prevent prior restraint, the United States
Supreme Court set forth an exacting test to be met before a prior re-
straint may be issued:
(1) the nature and extent of pre-trial publicity must impair
the right to a fair trial;
(2) no less restrictive alternative measures exist which would
mitigate the effects of the publicity; and
(3) a prior restraint would effectively prevent the harm.112
In Nebraska Press, the Supreme Court ultimately vacated the restraining
order on the media, noting that "prior restraints on speech and publica-
tion are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First
Amendment rights."1 "3 Additionally, the Court emphasized that "the
protection against prior restraint should have particular force as applied
to reporting of criminal proceedings."'1 4
In Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. United States District
Court ("CBS"), I 5 a post-Nebraska Press decision on all fours with the
case at hand, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated an order re-
straining CBS from disseminating or broadcasting surveillance tapes
108. Id (quoting Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).
109. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
110. Id at 543-44.
111. Id at 567-68.
112. Id at 562-68. The strictness of this test has caused one commentator to state that the
decision in Nebraska Press acts as a virtual bar to the use of prior restraints on the media as a
method of resolving the free press/fair trial conflict. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 858-59 (2d ed. 1988).
113. Nebraska Pres 427 U.S. at 559. In fact, a review of the various opinions in Nebraska
Pres suggest that five justices felt that a prior restraint could never be sustained in connection
with a claim that publication would deny a criminal defendant his right to a fair trial. Justice
White stated that "there is grave doubt in my mind whether orders with respect to the press
such as were entered in this case would ever be justifiable." Id at 570.
114. Id at 559. In fact, "the publication of information relating to alleged governmental
misconduct... has traditionally been recognized as lying at the core of the First Amend-
ment." Butterworth v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1376, 1381 (1990).
115. 729 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1983).
19921
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made in the investigation of John DeLorean.116 The court of appeals
held that the lower court had failed to meet the requirements set forth in
Nebraska Press. 117
In issuing a restraining order, the district court in CBS had relied
on its finding that DeLorean's case had generated enormous publicity
and that telecast of the tapes would necessarily have a devastating effect
on the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.11 The court of
appeals denounced this finding as speculative, reasoning that speculation
over whether a jury would be prejudiced by the impact of the media was
not enough to satisfy the first prong of the Nebraska Press test.'" 9 In the
Ninth Circuit's words, "[W]hile it is speculation that the telecast would
impair the defendant's Sixth Amendment right, [the only] certainty is
that the restraining order would violate freedom of the press."' 2
In analyzing the second prong of the Nebraska Press test, the dis-
trict court in CBS concluded that no alternative methods were adequate
to remove the taint of the publicity on potential jurors.' 21 The court of
appeals, however, found the record infirm for failure to even consider
other alternatives. The appellate court deemed the district court's state-
ment that "much thought and analysis had been devoted to the consider-
ation of alternatives"' 22 entirely unpersuasive and discounted the lower
court's finding that no effective alternatives to the restraint existed. The
Ninth Circuit chastised the district court for what it saw as a conclusory
treatment of one option and total disregard of alternative choices.' 23
Finally, the appellate court in CBS found that the district court had
not met the third part of the Nebraska Press test because it had failed to
116. The facts of CBS are virtually identical to the case at hand. The CBS case involved a
series of surveillance tapes filmed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation implicating John Z.
DeLorean in a cocaine transaction. After DeLorean was charged with drug conspiracy, CBS
obtained copies of the video tapes from an independent source and intended to televise nation-
ally the tapes on 60 Minutes and The CBS Evening News After DeLorean's counsel was in-
formed of the proposed telecast, he filed in district court for a restraining order, contending
that the telecast would be prejudicial to the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.
See id at 1176-77.
117. Id. at 1178.
118. Id at 1176.
119. Id at 1179-80.
120. James Gaspich, Note, John Z. DeLorean v. The Media: The Right to a Fair Trial
Without a Prior Restraint upon the Media, 15 GOLDEN GATE UNIV. L. REv. 81, 95 (1985).
121. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 729 F.2d 1174, 1179
(9th Cir. 1984).
122. It at 1182.
123. The court criticized the district court for its cursory consideration and subsequent
rejection of extensive voir dire as a viable alternative, while concurrently failing to address any
other options. Id,
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show that a prior restraint would prevent the harm. 124 While acknowl-
edging the enormous national publicity that the DeLorean case gener-
ated, the Ninth Circuit rejected the contention that dissemination of the
video tapes would be prejudicial.' 25 The court concluded that even when
pre-trial publicity is widespread, adverse news coverage alone does not
necessarily result in an unfair trial. 126 Relying on Nixon v. Warner Com-
munications, Inc., 127 the court noted that although the Watergate tapes
may have generated perhaps the most pervasive pre-trial publicity ever, it
would still be possible to empanel an impartial jury. 2 It is important to
note that despite the broadcast of the tapes in CBS, DeLorean was ac-
quitted by the jury. 2 9
2. District Court Lacked Evidentiary Justification
to Issue Prior Restraint
As Justice Marshall's dissent in Cable News Network v. Noriega'3 o
aptly stated:
The court issued this [prior restraint] order without any finding
that suppression of the broadcast was necessary to protect
Noriega's right to a fair trial, reasoning that no such determina-
tion need be made unless and until CNN surrendered the tapes
for the court's inspection .... [T]his case is of extraordinary
consequence for freedom of the press .... If the... courts are
correct in their remarkable conclusion that publication can be
automatically restrained pending application of the demanding
test established by Nebraska Press, then I think it is imperative
that we re-examine the premises of [the law itself].
13 1
Judge Hoeveler issued the prior restraint on CNN without even
minimal compliance with the burden unambiguously imposed by Ne-
braska Pres& Instead, the district court relied on a series of speculative
124. Id. at 1183-84.
125. Id at 1180.
126. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 729 F.2d 1174, 1179
(9th Cir. 1983).
127. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
128. CBS 729 F.2d at 1179-80. The court cited several well-publicized cases that were not
prejudiced despite massive publicity. It See infra note 169.
129. This showed that the publicity's adverse effects may be avoided by careful jury selec-
tion, jury instructions, and other forms of jury control. See infra note 155 and accompanying
text. See also Scott A. Hagen, Note KUTV v. Wilkinson: Another Episode in the Fair Trial!
Free Press Saga, 3 UTAH L. REV. 739, 751-53 (1985) (for empirical study of effective jury
instructions to overcome heavy adverse publicity).
130. 111 S. Ct. 451 (1990).
131. I
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inferences and possibilities to justify its restraint. The court implied that
restraint was justified because CNN had obtained taped conversations
between Noriega and his defense team, and because some of the informa-
tion on the tapes might have been protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege.1 32 (Noriega may have waived the privilege, however, by failing to
follow proper prison procedure.) 133 Without any firm proof, the court
concluded that these possibly privileged communications, if disclosed to
either the government (who had done the taping) or the public, might
reveal information that could endanger Noriega's right to a fair trial."3
In its reliance on speculation, the district court ignored the first re-
quirement of Nebraska Press, which rejects the notion that a prior re-
straint can be supported by speculative concern that some harm will
occur as a result of publication. 131 Under this prong of Nebraska Press,
the publicity must impair the defendant's right to a fair trial. 36 Here,
the district court had a fair idea of the content of the tapes, and could at
least have made an assessment of the harm based on the comments of
Frank Rubino during the initial hearing--comments that the court
echoed in its own order. 3 ' The court, however, failed to do so. As in
CBS,'38 speculation over whether a telecast of tapes is likely to prejudice
the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights is inadequate to satisfy the first
prong of the Nebraska Press test. While the harm to Noriega was specu-
lative, the restraint was certain to freeze CNN.
Similarly, the trial judge in Nebraska Press found that, although the
sensational murder trial would generate "intense and pervasive pre-trial
publicity" that "might impair the defendant's right to a fair trial,"'3 9
such a conclusion was necessarily speculative because it involved factors
"unknown and unknowable"'' and did not satisfy the degree of cer-
tainty that prior restraint requires.' 4 ' Applying this rationale to the
Noriega case, the district court's finding that "it was impossible to deter-
132. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1032, 1034-35 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
133. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
134. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1032, 1035-36 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
135. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562-63 (1976). The government con-
tended that a prior restraint was necessary to preserve the status quo because neither the court
nor Noriega knew the precise contents of the tapes. See Transcript, supra note 28, at 81.
Preserving the status quo does not begin to approach the high standard of certainty the court
has required before issuing a restraint. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 559-60.
136. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 729 F.2d 1174, 1180
(9th Cir. 1984).
137. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
138. 729 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1984).
139. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 562-63.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 569.
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a. Sequestration of the Prosecution Could Have Eradicated Any
Harm by Disclosure
The court could have prevented any harm to Noriega's ability to
obtain a fair trial resulting from improper disclosure to the prosecution
by requiring the government prosecutors to take steps to avoid being
tainted by any broadcast information. Sequestering the prosecution is
routinely done in a wide variety of cases where the government seeks to
avoid the taint of prosecutorial misconduct or improper electronic sur-
veillance.' 5 ' In fact, the United States Attorney General's office indi-
cated at the November 10th hearing that it was proceeding to do just
that.'52 The court, however, inexplicably chose not to exercise this op-
tion until November 21st-after the restraint had been lifted. 153 By that
time, it was too late for the sequestration of the prosecution to have any
bearing on the restraint proceedings.' 54
b. Numerous Alternatives Existed to Remedy Any Potential Tainting
of Possible Jurors
Courts have used a variety of methods to combat the perceived risk
of prejudicial publicity tainting the jury pool. These include: change of
venue, careful voir dire of prospective jury members, specific judicial in-
structions, sequestration of the trial participants, and postponement of
(9th Cir. 1983) (incomplete consideration of the Nebraska Press analysis was cause for reversal
of the restraining order).
See also In re Russell, 726 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 837 (1984).
The court, "by merely concluding that alternatives of postponement, change of venue, and jury
control were infeasible was not responsive to the Nebraska Press requirement of degree of
certainty that these or other measures would not be effective." Pappas, .supra note 93, at 1029.
151. The alternative of insulating the prosecution to prevent tainting it with defense infor-
mation has been successfully applied and judicially approved. For example, the independent
counsel's office in the Iran-contra affair had prosecutors who shut themselves off from Oliver
North's highly publicized testimony. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554-56 (1977);
U.S. v. Poindexter, 698 F. Supp. 300, 312-13 (D.D.C. 1988), vacated in part, rev'd in part on
other grounds sub nom, U.S. v. North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
152. Transcript of Hearing Before the Honorable William M. Hoeveler, United States Dis-
trict Judge, Nov. 10, 1990, at 4, United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
(No. 88-79-CR).
153. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1045, 1048 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
154. The court ordered the sequestration of the entire prosecution team, including members
of the Justice Department, investigators, document handlers, and witnesses, but not until No-
vember 21, three days after the prior restraint was orally lifted by the court The reason given
by the district court for not starting this process earlier was that an "effective and complete
sequestration" would "require at least a few days to put in place .... United States v.
Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1045, 1049 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
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mine... the extent to which Noriega's right to a fair trial would be
hampered by disclosure"1 2 could not justify prior restraint under Ne-
braska Press. Thus, since the defense produced no evidence to demon-
strate the adverse consequences, the possibility of harm coming to the
defense strategy from a telecast of the tapes was entirely speculative.
Unjustifiably, the district court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals blamed CNN for this lack of evidence, even though CNN had
no obligation to come forward with any information. 43 In any case in-
volving a prior restraint, the party seeking the restraining order is the one
who must show with a degree of certainty that the restraining order is
necessary to insure the defendant a trial before an impartial jury.'"
Moreover, the temporary nature of the restraint does not reduce
Noriega's burden of justification. 45 Here, the district court reversed
this burden of proof by requiring CNN to come forward with the tapes
and prove that they contained no prejudicial information,'" although it
was Noriega's obligation, not CNN's, to demonstrate the existence of
harm. The district court's shifting of the burden of proof to the censored
party was squarely at odds with decisions requiring the movant to justify
the prior restraint.
3. Failure to Investigate Alternatives
The district court also failed to meet the second requirement of Ne-
braska Press, which requires a court to consider whether viable alterna-
tives to prior restraint exist. 47 The First Amendment bars issuance of a
prior restraint if less drastic measures will adequately protect the defend-
ant's right to a fair trial.148 Under this principle, the district court was
required to articulate specific findings as to why other measures would
not suffice to protect the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.1 49 The
court's failure to address less severe alternatives was reason alone to re-
verse its decision."' 0
142. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1032, 1034 (S.D. Fla. 1990). In fact, it ap-
peared that the court restrained CNN because it believed it was "fundamentally unfair for
CNN to benefit from not producing the tapes," thus precluding the court from "knowing the
precise contents of the speech sought to be protected." Id. at 1035-36.
143. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
144. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 557-59 (1976).
145. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714-15 (1971) (Black, Douglas,
JJ., concurring).
146. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1032, 1034 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
147. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 562-65.
148. Id at 563-65.
149. Id at 553-55.
150. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 729 F.2d 1174, 1182.83
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the trial until dissipation of any prejudicial effects of publicity.'5 5 The
district court in this case not only failed to consider these alternatives,
but also failed to show that no alternatives could have been devised to
avoid or limit the possible effects of prejudicial publicity arising from
CNN's broadcast. The mere existence of the tapes should have provided
sufficient reason for the district court to evaluate the appropriateness of
remedies short of a prior restraint.
4. Questions Regarding Efficacy of the Restraint Left Unanswered
In order to analyze the potential effectiveness of a prior restraint, it
is first necessary to understand which of the defendant's rights are jeop-
ardized. Under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant has the
right to counsel and the right to a fair and speedy trial. The right to
counsel has been interpreted to encompass not only the right to effective
legal representation, but also the right to speak freely with an attorney
without fear that confidential information will be disclosed. 15 6 Any con-
fidential communications between an attorney and a client are protected
from discovery under the attorney-client privilege.
157
In the instant case, Noriega claimed that his right to effective coun-
sel included the right to keep secret from the prosecution his trial strat-
egy and tactics. He asserted that this right could be jeopardized by
broadcast of the tapes containing conversations with his defense attor-
ney. Noriega failed, however, to present evidence supporting this hy-
pothesized result. Even if Noriega were able to demonstrate a legitimate
threat to the secrecy of his trial strategy, alternatives existed that would
have adequately protected this interest.I s" Moreover, the effectiveness of
the restraining order in preventing prosecutorial discovery of the defense
strategy is in serious doubt. While not established during the court pro-
ceedings, it is highly likely that the prosecution already had access to
some of the tapes because the tapes had travelled a circuitous route
through several governmental agencies and foreign governments to reach
CNN.15 9 If the prosecution had already heard the tapes, any desire to
keep information secret from the prosecution did not justify prior re-
straint in this case.
According to Noriega, the court had a duty to ensure that the attor-
155. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-64 (1976). See also Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358-63 (1966).
156. Linda Greenhouse, Prior Restraints and Right to Counsel Entangle Noriega Legal
Case, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1990, at A20.
157. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 34 (2d ed. 1984).
158. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
159. Transcript, supra note 28, at 123-24.
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ney-client conversations were not revealed.16° Noriega argued that be-
cause an accused's right to communicate privately with counsel is of
constitutional dimension, 16 ' any broadcast of the tapes would constitute
a per se invalid intrusion of his constitutional rights. This argument,
however, incorrectly characterizes the privilege held by Noriega. The
attorney-client privilege is not founded in the Constitution, but is a com-
mon law creation, 62 derived from a policy seeking to encourage full and
frank discussion between a client and his lawyer. 63 The district court
acknowledged that this interest in forthrightness was "frustrated by the
very fact of [the government's] invasion.""' Once CNN received the
tapes, the purpose of the privilege was thwarted, and no subsequent prior
restraint could salvage the defendant's interest in confidentiality. 6
A criminal defendant's right to a fair trial under the Sixth Amend-
ment is the critical third prong in Nebraska Press. The right to a fair
trial, however, does not mean the right to a perfect trial. 66 Even perva-
sive adverse publicity does not invariably lead to the conclusion that a
defendant received an unfair trial. 67 To prove a trial was unfair, the
court must find that it was impossible to find twelve jurors who could
render an impartial verdict based on the evidence presented in the case,
rather than on the influence of potentially biased media coverage. 16
Abundant legal precedents' 69 hold that "it is possible to find an impartial
jury to try almost anyone, no matter how notorious the defendant or
highly publicized the case." 17 0
Nebraska Press has been the strongest case in favor of a prior re-
straint based on harm caused by adverse pre-trial publicity. There, the
Supreme Court rejected a plea to halt publication of an alleged mur-
160. Id. at 68.
161. Ide See also Motion of General Manuel Antonio Noriega for Injunction, United States
v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (No. 88-79-CR).
162. 8 WIGMORE EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
163. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
164. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1032, 1033 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
165. Moreover, the impact on this privilege (if not waived) came from the government's
interception of the conversations, not CNN's actions in telecasting information about possible
governmental misconduct.
166. Jentges v. Milwaukee County Circuit Court, 733 F.2d 1238, 1244 (7th Cir. 1984).
167. See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
168. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 569 (1976).
169. United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980) (recent "Abscam" case where
despite widespread publicity, including a telecast of surveillance tapes, less than one-half of
prospective jurors indicated they had ever heard of Abscam); Nixon v. Warner Communica-
tions, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978) (where court noted it would be possible to empanel a jury
whose members had never even heard of the Watergate tapes).
170. Greenhouse, supra note 156.
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derer's confession before trial.1"" Prejudice to the future jury was a real
possibility: the case involved multiple necrophilic murders that had
taken place in a rural town of only 850 people.1" 2 The Supreme Court
held, however, that restraining publication was unconstitutional, even on
those sensational facts.1"" Noriega's claim of jury prejudice in the pres-
ent case is feeble. In the words of one commentator, "CNN's broadcast
of the tapes could add no more than a feather's weight to the negative
image of General Noriega already imprinted on the minds of Ameri-
cans."' 174 If Oliver North, John DeLorean, and the Watergate defend-
ants all obtained fair trials in the face of massive nationwide publicity,1 75
so too can General Noriega. Even assuming in a worst-case scenario that
Noriega confessed to the crimes with which he is charged in the conver-
sations intercepted by the government-a restraining order should not
have been issued because there was no showing that any of the require-
ments of Nebraska Press were satisfied.
B. The Appellate Court's Decision
1. Erroneous Analysis Under Inapplicable Case Law
The Eleventh Circuit initially violated its duty when it failed to en-
sure that the lower court had satisfied each of the requirements of Ne-
braska Press before issuing the prior restraint. 76 Rather than addressing
the exacting standards set forth in Nebraska Press, the court of appeals
fashioned a weaker constitutional test from the Supreme Court's "ac-
cess" cases. Using this lower standard, the appellate court determined
that the temporary restraining order imposed on CNN was constitutional
because it had met the lower burden of proof imposed by that test.1 77
This reconstruction of the proper test represents a fundamental misun-
171. Nebraska Press; 427 U.S. at 570.
172. Id at 542.
173. Id at 570.
174. Lewis, supra note 5. The former dictator is extremely disliked by the American public
for his notorious dictatorship and drug trafficking involvement. Even President Bush "has
called him a 'thug' and 'narco-terrorist."' Id
175. See, eg., U.S. v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 61-62 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (even the intensive
publicity surrounding Watergate did not prevent the empaneling of impartial jurors).
176. The appellate court must look to see that the trial court made each of the determina-
tions as described. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562-66 (1976).
177. In fact, the court of appeals even went so far as to suggest that the trial judge may take
protective measures "even when they are not strictly and inescapably necessary," because the
trial judge has an affirmative duty to minimize the efflects of prejudicial publicity. United
States v. Noriega, 917 F.2d at 1549. This statement is simply untrue-a court must make
specific findings that there is a clear and immediate danger of irreparable harm to the defend-
ant before any restraint may be taken. Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 568-69.
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derstanding of the law; the right of the press to be free from prior re-
straint is distinct from, and afforded stronger protection than, the
media's right of access to governmental information." 8
In its decision, the court of appeals erroneously analyzed the prior
restraint issue as a question of the media's right of access to information
about the Noriega case. The Eleventh Circuit relied on the decision in
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., I 9 which concerned broadcast-
ers' efforts to obtain access to copies of the Nixon tapes, rather than a
prior restraint on the media. Based on Nixon, the Eleventh Circuit in
Noriega reasoned that the district court could properly issue a prior re-
straint prohibiting CNN from broadcasting the information it pos-
sessed 80 because the general public has "no right of access to private
communications between a defendant and his counsel."'81  Further, the
court held that the media is entitled to no more information than the
public.'8 2 As a result of this legal error, the court of appeals' analysis
ignored CNN's First Amendment right to be free from prior restraint
and gave unnecessary weight to the concerns advanced by Noriega.
The above reasoning directly conflicts with prior case law, which
has repeatedly stressed the significant distinction between the exacting
standards applicable in determining the constitutional validity of prior
restraint and the level of judicial inquiry required in determining a First
Amendment right to access. By confusing the two standards, the court
of appeals completely disregarded the mandates of Nebraska Press,' 3
New York Times, "4 Near, "5 and similar cases. In Gannett Co. v. DePas-
quale ("Gannett"), '86 on which the Noriega appellate court relied in up-
holding the prior restraint against CNN,'87 the Supreme Court
specifically distinguished the First Amendment issues presented by ac-
cess claims from the more stringent standards that govern the question of
prior restraint. In Gannett, the Court held that the lower court's orders
178. With a prior restraint, a court or other governmental official is attempting to prohibit
the media from disseminating or publishing information the media has already obtained. In an
access case, the newspaper or telecaster is attempting to obtain information that is in the gov-
ernment's possession. Pappas, supra note 93.
179. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
180. United States v. Noriega, 917 F.2d at 1548, 1552.
181. Id. at 1548.
182. Id
183. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
184. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
185. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
186. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
187. United States v. Noriega, 917 F.2d at 1549-50.
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excluding the public and press from a pre-trial suppression hearing
presented a different question from that found in a restraint case:
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart is of no assistance... in
this case. The Nebraska Press case involved a direct prior re-
straint imposed by a trial judge on the members of the press,
prohibiting them from disseminating information about a crim-
inal trial. Since "it has been generally, if not universally, con-
sidered that it is the chief purpose of the [First Amendment's]
guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication," the
Court held that the order violated the constitutional guarantee
of a free press .... The exclusion order in the present case, by
contrast, did not prevent the petitioner from publishing any in-
formation in its possession. The proper inquiry, therefore, is
whether the petitioner was denied any constitutional right of
access.
188
In light of the distinct standards applicable to prior restraints, the Elev-
enth Circuit's decision to be "guided" 8 9 by cases involving court access
was simply inexplicable.
2. Ordering CNN to Turn over the Tapes Was an Issue
Not Before the Court
The court of appeals' order continuing the prior restraint seemed to
indicate a belief that CNN's First Amendment claims should be rejected
because CNN had not turned over the tapes for the district court's re-
view. The appellate court expressed its irritation in the last line of its
decision: "No litigant should continue to violate a district court's order
[to turn over the tapes] and attempt to have that district court's order
reviewed at the same time." 1 90 The appellate court seemed to think that
CNN had violated two orders-the temporary restraining order and the
order to produce the tapes. Although the network had refused to turn
over its tapes, Judge Hoeveler had stayed that order pending appellate
review, 91 so technically no violation occurred. Additionally, the issue of
a violation of the temporary restraining order was not directly before the
Eleventh Circuit. The appellate court's ruling on matters other than the
188. Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 393 n.25 (citations omitted). (See also Richmond Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 586 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) (recognizing that
governmental efforts to restrain communications are different from access claims).
189. United States v. Noriega, 917 F.2d at 1549.
190. Id. at 1552.
191. Transcript, supra note 28, at 119-20.
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constitutionality of the prior restraint constituted yet another legal
blunder.
V. CONCLUSION
The harm that Noriega feared would result from the telecast was
caused by the government's conduct, not by CNN's actions, and could
have been eliminated by means less intrusive than an egregious infringe-
ment on CNN's First Amendment rights. Although Noriega may have
been justified in seeking a prior restraint to protect his attorney-client-
privileged information, Noriega made no showing that a CNN telecast
would certainly have caused additional harm beyond that already in-
flicted by the government's recording of his conversations. Additionally,
alternatives to prior restraint were both readily available and numerous.
Further, no judicial balancing analysis of the efficacy of the restraint oc-
curred, although the restraint in fact constituted a swift and silencing
remedy. Focusing solely on the pre-trial publicity, the courts failed to
use their resources to remedy the real wrong: the fact that the tapes had
been made at all. The courts should have directed their energies to find-
ing out how the tapes had come into existence. CNN merely disclosed
the wrong that had taken place. Gagging CNN only served to punish a
news medium that had faithfully executed its role of reporting on crimi-
nal proceedings and allegations of unlawful governmental actions. What
occurred was a classic example of shooting the messenger. In a case of
this magnitude, the shot was surely felt by press and other media around
the world.
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